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On Fiscal, Monetary and other Economic 
Problems of Chiang Kai-shek’s Regime
(1928–1949)
In the mid-1928, Chiang Kai-shek’s units took control of Beijing and Tianjin 
in eff ect terminating the Northern Expedition, which had started two years 
earlier. In October 1928, Chiang Kai-shek initiated the formation of a new 
central government, a step that was to become the beginning of a new era in 
China’s modern history. For China, Chiang’s government to a large extent 
represented the long-awaited hope for the end of the dramatic period of in-
stability, chaos and general disintegration. At fi rst sight, Chiang seemed to 
be a charismatic leader with a great opportunity to lift China and remove its 
principal problems. In addition, he had many indisputable advantages when 
compared to his competitors. He gained the support of many prominent re-
presentatives from among the Chinese economic elites and, more important-
ly, his previous military achievements won him the respect of many western 
powers, for which he and his government were – in the given circumstances 
– the most suitable partners on the Chinese political scene.
After the formation of a new, nation-wide government, Chiang pre-
sented a very ambitious programme for the stabilization and modernization 
of China, which focused on economic goals. Especially in the fi rst years, 
Chiang tried to reorganize Chinese society according to his ideas and to 
achieve western-inspired economic, legal and social reforms. After a lengthy 
polemic, a new Civil Code was published, based on the French, German and 
Swiss models.1 In the late 1920s, China also established tariff  autonomy and 
thus could freely begin to form a new customs policy. With the help of the 
new planning bodies, the Nanking government began supporting infra-
1)  For more information on the legislative changes, see Michal TOMÁŠEK, Dějiny čínského 
práva [A History of Chinese Law], Prague 2004, pp. 249–270.
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ned reforms and changes in the lives of the people was somewhat minimal. 
Infl uenced by the gentry, many Chinese followed the old regulations and 
established customs, despite some of them no longer being legal.3
Nevertheless, the status and behaviour of the gentry were only one 
of many reasons why the reform results lagged behind original expectations 
and for the failure of the reform plans. The continuing lack of stable power 
within China, military confl icts (both battles with the Japanese and several 
local confl icts), various and often protracted economic problems and, last but 
not least, the demoralization of the Nanking government, which led to wide-
spread corruption, were among other important and easily-identifi ed causes.
As has been suggested, the application of an effi  cient new govern-
mental economic policy and the related economic revitalization of China, 
which were also intended to solve long-term fi scal problems, were an impor-
tant part of Chiang’s reform programme. Since the fall of the monarchy, no 
Chinese government had succeeded in securing control over tax collection 
to prevent extensive “evasions”. In practice, a substantial part of the taxes 
collected stayed in provinces or were seized by one of the warlords. Roughly 
half of all state income came from maritime customs and tax revenue from 
salt. Though the central government was in charge of collecting the impor-
tant land tax, the collected amounts nevertheless stayed, with only a few 
exceptions, in the provinces. Through the decree of 1928, the nationalist 
government formally yielded the collected amounts to the provinces, which 
meant that in practice it surrendered economic control of the segment of the 
Chinese economy which produced roughly two thirds of gross domestic pro-
duct. From the 1920s, the situation was so precarious that Beijing’s fi nancial 
control almost disappeared.4 The following years did not bring any improve-
ments as the government’s tax income kept decreasing: from 86 million Chi-
nese dollars in 1922, it dropped to 47 million Chinese dollars in 1928. The 
situation became critical in 1926, when the provincial administration, in 
3)  Cf. paper on social, economic and other changes in one of the regions in Zhejiang province 
by R. Keith SCHOPPA, Contours of Revolutionary Change in a Chinese County, 1900–1950, in: 
The Journal of Asian Studies, Volume 51, No. 4 (November 1992), Association for Asian Stu-
dies, Ann Arbor 1992, pp. 770–796.
4)  Abert FEUERWERKER, Economic Trends in the Republic of China, 1912–1949, Michigan Pa-
pers in Chinese Studies No. 31, The University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies, Ann 
Arbor 1977, p. 77.
structure expansion, building important new railways and roads. Foreign 
advisors were hired to improve the economic situation. An extensive plan for 
the formation of a new, effi  cient educational system was developed. In 1934, 
a bill for a new school reform was formulated, which was intended to impro-
ve the quality of education, guaranteeing at least a minimum level of educa-
tion to all children.2
It soon became apparent that imposing modernization and revita-
lization changes would be an intensely demanding and complicated task. 
Chiang’s reform plans generally ended as unrealized visions or were only 
completed in a reduced, deformed way. This failure was due to several fac-
tors, which infl uenced the reform process to varying extents. Chiang’s go-
vernment could form and approve a promising and pragmatic programme 
of economic and other reforms, though the capacity of the Nanking govern-
ment to push through the introduction of such reforms in practice was so-
mewhat limited. Chiang and his army never really gained control over the 
whole of China. Large border regions of China were completely beyond his 
government’s authority. Despite some provinces being offi  cially administe-
red by the Nanking government, they were in reality under complete control 
of local warlords. Even in provinces directly occupied by Chiang’s soldiers, 
the Nanking government’s capacity to infl uence the everyday life of the gene-
ral population was tenuous. The government controlled the higher and 
middle administrative bodies, yet at lower levels administration was tradi-
tionally in the hands of rich families. In the country, this powerful elite was 
represented by the largest landowners, who formed the economically stron-
gest stratum, often while also functioning as local usurers. Their children 
were sent to study in order to take control of pivotal offi  ces in the local or 
provincial administration. The local level was thus often characterized by 
a very close personal interconnection between government machinery and 
the economically strongest groups. This elite (gentry) in reality had at its 
disposal almost unlimited powers in local matters and to a large extent was 
independent of the central government. The generally restrained attitude of 
the local gentry contributed to the fact that the impact of the afore-mentio-
2)  For more information on educational system problems in the period before the formation 
of Chiang’s government, see Ka-Che YIP, Warlordism and Educational Finances, 1916–1927, 
in: Perspectives on a Changing China: Essays in Honor of Professor C. Martin Wilbur on the 
Occasion of His Retirement, Joshua A. FOGEL and William T. ROWE, eds., Boulder 1979, pp. 
183–195.
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to the coins in circulation.7 After a considerable exertion, the Nanking go-
vernment managed to enforce the abolition of the tael in 1933. As part of the 
currency reform in 1935, the circulation of silver dollars was banned and 
a new currency, commonly called the fabi, introduced.8
During the Guomindang’s rule, the modern Chinese banking sy-
stem was dominated by four institutions, all controlled by prominent people 
in the regime, who used them as political tools, as well as for their personal 
enrichment. It was generally believed that the Central Bank of China was do-
minated by H. H. Kung (Kong Xiangxi), the Bank of Communications was run 
by clique of Chen brothers,9 the Bank of China was controlled by T. V. Sung (T. 
V. Soong, Song Ziwen) and, last but not least, the Farmers Bank of China was 
dominated by high-ranking Chinese army offi  cers.10 Banks in the provinces 
7)  Customs statistics were calculated in Haiguan taels. After the abolition of the tael in 1933, 
they were usually compiled in Chinese dollars or in the Customs Gold Unit (hereafter refer-
red to as CGU). The CGU was introduced in 1930 to make certain foreign trade payments; 
the fi xed exchange rate to USD was set as 1:0.40. The nature of the CGU gradually changed 
and it was in fact released into circulation for general use. Cf. the addition of the Czecho-
slovak crown to the list of currencies with fi xed exchange rates to the CGU, SHAC-MCSA, 
Part One: Inspector General’s Circulars, Reel 24, 679 (1) 26916, Circular No. 5211 (29. 1. 
1936), signed by F. W. Maze (Inspector General).
8)  Fabi, legal tender offi  cially valid in the entire country. The bank notes contained the word 
yuan in Roman script. The monetary system reform was to be based on the introduction of 
a modern currency supported by foreign currency reserves, which were established in Chi-
na primarily thanks to extensive American purchase of silver. From 1935, the use of silver 
as currency was banned and only bank notes issued by the Central Bank of China, the Bank 
of China and the Bank of Communications were legal. For more information, see Lloyd E. 
EASTMAN, Nationalist China during the Nanking decade, 1927–1937, in: The Nationalist Era 
in China 1927–1949, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991, pp. 41 and 46.
9)  The Chen brothers infl uence was based on their positions in the Guomindang apparatus. 
Chen Lifu was the party’s secretary general (1929–1932), the head of its Organizational De-
partment (1933–1936); from 1928 he was in charge of the party’s Security Department, later 
the Committee for Investigation; in 1937–1945, he was the Minister of Education. Chen 
Guofu controlled Guomindang party machinery from the position of the head of the per-
sonnel department of Chiang’s secretariat.
10)  For more information on the position of the “big four” in Chinese banking, see Zhaojin JI, 
A history of modern Shanghai banking: the rise and decline of China’s fi nance capitalism, 
Armonk, New York 2003, pp. 172–195. 
eff ect the warlords, kept 38 million Chinese dollars from the taxes collected, 
with only 9 million reaching Beijing.5
In the decade before the beginning of the war with Japan in 1937, 
the nationalist government had considerable achievements in the fi scal sphe-
re. It abolished lijin (likin), the interior tax, which had for years hampered 
the development of trade.6 Tax collection was centralized and the tax offi  ces 
were given a more effi  cient central management system. All tax offi  ces were 
transferred to the authority of three governmental institutions – Customs 
Service, Salt Monopoly Administration and Internal Income Administration. 
The tax collection system was made more effi  cient and, after China achieved 
the tariff  autonomy, it resulted in a substantial increase in government inco-
me. Nevertheless, the outbreak of war with Japan in 1937 resulted in the na-
tionalist government losing control of the coastal provinces and important 
ports, which necessarily lead to a considerable decrease in tax revenue.
One of the primary tasks of the nationalist government was impo-
sing order on the monetary system, which in China had been completely 
chaotic for decades. In 1914, the silver dollar was offi  cially proclaimed the 
national currency of the Republic of China. In the 1920s and 1930s, the out-
fl ow of silver from China increased and the silver standard was no longer 
sustainable. During the “military administrators” government, bizarre 
currencies were in circulation. Prices were mostly stated in taels, units of 
silver standard, which was quite confusing. A tael was a unit of bullion, 
which had a specifi c weight and purity. One of the problem was that tael va-
lue in diff erent areas fl uctuated and the tael did not have a stable rate linked 
5)  P. T. CHEN, Public Finance, in: The Chinese Yearbook, 1935–1936, Shanghai 1936, p. 1298.
6)  The Chinese promise to remove lijin played a particular role in the negotiations concer-
ning Chinese customs autonomy in the 1920s. Lijin was offi  cially abolished as of 1. 1. 1931. 
For more details on the closing down of the stations authorized to collect lijin, and their 
transformation into other purpose offi  ces, see the telegrams sent to and from the offi  ce of 
the general inspector of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service from the turn of 1930 and 
1931. For example: The Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing, The Maritime Cus-
toms Service Archive (hereafter referred to as SHAC-MCSA), Part Five: The Policing of Trade, 
Reel 236, 679 (1) 1304, Telegrams to Frederick Maze, received from Wenchow (22. 12.), Swa-
tow (22. 12.), Kowloon (3. 2. 1931).
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China’s generally high foreign debt was another great problem that 
the Nanking nationalist government had to deal with. Arthur Nichols Young, 
who worked as a fi nancial advisor to the Chinese government for almost 20 
years, classifi ed the structure of Chinese debt as possibly the most complica-
ted in the world.13 This is hardly surprising – it comprised liabilities for nu-
merous loans obtained during the imperial period, reparations that China 
pledged to pay in signing the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and the chaos of govern-
mental bonds issued after the revolution in 1911. These obligations were 
a huge burden for the nationalist government – in the fi rst fi scal year of its 
existence, it had to spend half of its income on paying the principal and inte-
rest on the principal, and until the war with Japan, it paid an average of 33% 
of its entire income for this purpose.14 Compounding this, China annually 
spent higher amounts on debts than it received in the form of new loans.15
Table I: Development of the Index of Retail Prices in China in 1937–1948 
(Year 1937 = 100)
Year 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942
Index 100 176 323 724 1980 6620
Year 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948
Index 22 800 75 500 249 100 627 210 10 340 000 287 700 000
Source: Albert FEUERWERKER, Economic Trends 1912–49, in: The Cambridge History of 
China, Volume 12, Republican China 1912–1949, Part 1, ed. by John King FAIRBANK, 
Cambridge 1983, p. 114. Cf. Arthur N. YOUNG, China and the Helping Hand, 1937–1945, 
Cambridge (Mass.) 1963, p. 435.
The nationalist government’s foreign debt continued to increase after 1937. 
After December 1941, foreign aid continued at a higher rate; an American 
loan of 500 million American dollars (contract from March 21, 1942), a Bri-
13)  Arthur N. YOUNG, China’s Fiscal Transformation, 1927–1937. in: Strenuous Decade: China’s 
Nation Building Eff orts, 1927–1937, ed. by Paul K. T. SHIH, New York 1970, p. 112.
14)  James E. SHERIDAN, China in Disintegration. The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912–
1949, New York, London 1977, p. 222. 
15)  In 1902–1913, China paid on average of 89.2 million Chinese dollars, in 1913–1930 it was 
70.9 million; in the same periods it received on average 61.0 and 23.8 million Chinese 
dollars in the form of loans. REMER, Foreign Investments, p. 160.
were dependent on these four large institutions. The Central Bank of China 
did not function along the same lines to similar institutions in Western Euro-
pe did, instead it was an institution whose main goal was to provide short-
term loans to the government. Although in 1928–1937, 128 new bank branches 
were established, most frequently in the coastal regions, we can say that the 
modern banking system in China was not suffi  ciently developed.11 This sy-
stem mostly served the government, which continuously struggled with fi nan-
cial diffi  culties, caused by a constant fi scal defi cit. The growth of expenses was 
mainly caused by settling loans and an enormous increase in fi nancial instru-
ments spent on the armed forces. Considering that in the latter part of the 
1930s, 40–50% of governmental expenditure went to the army and a full third 
was used to pay loans, there was little left for other expenses.
In 1927–1935, the nationalist government in Nanking issued many 
bonds, mostly in an attempt to meet the rising costs of the growth in milita-
ry expenditure. During World War II, spending on the armed forces grew 
even more; at the end of the nationalist regime’s existence, its army had 
about 5 million men and gobbled up 70–80% of government expenses. Such 
behaviour from the ruling elite was not new in China. The Qing regime dealt 
with the unfavourable fi nancial situation by issuing state bonds in order to 
generate the fi nances it needed to pay war reparations to Japan after the lost 
war in 1895, as well as to pay for damages to international powers in accor-
dance with the Boxer Protocol of 1901, as well as other fi scal commitments. 
In 1912–1926, the domestic debt burden continued growing – for example, 
state bonds were issued in connection with the “reorganization loan” to Yuan 
Shikai’s regime and Japanese loans from 1918. Nevertheless, the total value 
of Chinese state bonds held by foreigners did not markedly increase – in 
1913, foreigners owned bonds to a value of USD 526 million, while in 1931 it 
was USD 696 million.12
11)  For details on the modern Chinese banking system cf. Frank M. TAMAGNA, Banking and 
Finance in China, Institute of Pacifi c Relations Publications Offi  ce, New York 1942, pp. 
121–196. For information on the development of the Chinese banking system, see also 
Linsun CHENG, Banking in modern China: entrepreneurs, professional managers and the 
development of Chinese banks, 1897–1937, Cambridge 2003. Cf. legislative changes concer-
ning banking and other fi nancial services in Michal TOMÁŠEK, Dějiny čínského práva [A 
History of Chinese Law], p. 260.
12)  For more information, see C. F. REMER, Foreign Investments in China, New York 1933, pp. 
123–147. 
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crop failure of 1940 (for the development of the index of retail prices, see 
Table I). In 1940–1946, prices in unoccupied China annually increased by 
approximately 300%. After the end of World War II, the situation improved 
for a short period of time, but in the last months of 1945 the price index 
started to soar.19 This trend was to be stopped by foreign loans, which was 
never a suffi  ciently practical instrument to be eff ective in improving the 
Chinese economy. The total sum of the foreign aid to China, from the start of 
the war in the Pacifi c in December 1941 to the rise of the communist regime 
in China in 1949, amounted to approximately 2.5–3 billion dollars.20 Despite 
American aid, the fi nancing of military forces was for the Chiang’s govern-
ment an increasingly onerous burden, which as has been mentioned pre-
viously, comprised 70% of its expenses.
The Chinese government’s plans concerning the improvement of 
the foreign trade situation after the war failed to be achieved. First of all, it 
did not manage to eliminate or even reduce the markedly passive balance. 
Measures stimulating export and limiting import essentially had no eff ect. 
In fact, the situation in this respect deteriorated, as in 1946 and 1947 the 
Chinese foreign trade defi cit reached 391 and 335 million American dollars 
respectively. If we also include supplies as part of the UNRRA with imports, 
we arrive at fi gures of 851 and 803 million USD,21 with over half of the sup-
plies being from the United States. Considering Chinese needs, only a small 
segment of the total import consisted of items which could directly aid and 
support the rapid revitalization and modernization of the Chinese economy.
Among other things, the nationalist government did not manage 
to halt the rapid growth in unemployment or suffi  ciently stimulate the revi-
talization of industrial production. For instance, in November 1946, the Mi-
nistry of the Economy released information that of 2441 factories left by the 
Japanese, they had managed to put into operation only 852. At the begin-
19)  FEUERWERKER, Economic Trends, p. 89.
20)  Researchers diff er as to the exact calculation of total foreign aid. Defi nitely the greatest 
share (over 90%) in total aid to Chiang’s government was that of the United States. In this 
context, we have to be aware that most of the American aid was provided to Chiang in 
1941–1946, while in the ensuing years, during the new civil war, its volume and extent 
changed dramatically. For more information on American aid to Chiang’s government, see 
John King FAIRBANK, The United States and China, Cambridge (Mass.) 1983, pp. 336–353.
21)  Harrison PARKER, International Payments of Postwar China, in: Pacifi c Aff airs, Volume 
21, No. 4 (Dec., 1948), University of British Columbia, Vancouver, p. 351.
tish loan of 50 million pounds (contract from May 2, 1944) and, more parti-
cularly, the aid based on the Lend-Lease Act, which in 1941–1946 exceeded 
1.5 billion dollars were most important.16 In short, the Japanese attack aga-
inst Pearl Harbour and the beginning of the war in the Pacifi c strengthened 
the position of Chiang’s Chongquing regime and nationalist China, which 
until then had received aid mainly from the USSR,17 became an important 
factor in general considerations, most notably in those of the United States,18 
which until the end of the war strove to keep China in the war against Japan 
at any cost. These fi nancial aids helped Chiang’s regime survive the war even 
though foreign aid was far from a universal panacea to its economic pro-
blems. In relation to this, we have to bear in mind that the means from 
abroad were partially misappropriated by the Guomindang elite or used for 
questionable purposes.
Undoubtedly, the most telling expression of the sharp deteriorati-
on in unoccupied China’s economic situation was a dramatic rise in infl ati-
on, mainly caused by the excessive distribution of new banknotes in re-
sponse to the rapidly growing fi scal defi cit, which in turn had been 
principally triggered by increasing military expenditure. Prior to 1937, in-
fl ation was generally moderate, though it increased in response to Japanese 
aggression in China proper. A rapid increase in infl ation occurred after the 
16)  In 1941–1946 the overall sum was 2.2 million dollars. The American obligation to fi nance 
American units in China, with the Chinese side charging expenses connected with the 
Americans using a fi xed exchange rate between the American and Chinese currency 
(1:20) was another form of “aid” to China. The Chinese raised this demand in 1943; at the 
beginning of that year the real course was about 1:50, while at the end of it, it was 1:100.
17)  F. F. Liu says that until the beginning of the war in the Pacifi c, the USSR loaned a total of 
300 million dollars, while the USA only 170 million dollars; F. F. LIU, A Military History of 
Modern China, 1924–1949, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1956, p. 208. For general 
information on aid to China during the war with Japan, cf. Arthur N. YOUNG, China and 
the Helping Hand, 1937–1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1963.
18)  For more information on American policy towards China during World War II, cf. Aleš SKŘI-
VAN Sr., Čína a Spojené státy 1941–1945 [China and the United States], Acta Universitatis Ca-
rolinae, Philosophica et Historica, Monographia LIII, Prague 1974. On American policy to-
wards China in the fi rst post-war years, see e.g. Jan WANNER, George C. Marshall: tvůrce 
armád a aliancí [George C. Marshall: Army and Alliance Maker], Prague – Litomyšl 1998, pp. 
275–292. For material on Marshall’s activities in China, see United States Relations with Chi-
na. With Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949, Washington 1949, pp. 605–695.
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disaster of the nationalist regime, accompanied by the astronomic growth of 
prices and the total collapse of the currency (Tables I and II).24
Table II: The Development of the Exchange Rate of American Dollar to the 
Chinese Currency (Fabi) in 1942–1945
 
1942 1943 1944 1945
1st half of the year  1:27–31  1:44–64  1:86–225 1:470–2250
2nd half of the year  1:32–50  1:63–98 1:188–680 1:650–3250
Source: Young, Arthur N.: China and the Helping Hand, 1937–1945, Cambridge (Mass.) 
1963, p. 437.
When seeking the causes of the Guomindang’s defeat, we undoubtedly have 
to look for answers in the military and economic spheres, but also in a cer-
tain “spiritual exhaustion” or ideological insuffi  ciency. The loss of credibility 
and respect from the general public, the Guomindang’s repressive policy, 
corruption in the governmental machinery, the failure of American media-
tion, as well as the inability of the nationalist government to implement the 
necessary reforms undoubtedly also played an important role. Chiang’s regi-
me demonstrated an admirable capacity for self-destruction and even Ame-
rican aid25 could not save it. Nevertheless, we can fi nd the opinion that the 
fact that Chiang and the Guomindang managed to lose the civil war was 
a truly remarkable performance.26 In fact, it is no mystery. The fall of Chian-
g’s regime and the victory of the communists were, in a way, merely the logi-
cal outcome of previous developments.27
24)  For more information on the currency development in 1947–1949, see Richard C. K. BURDE-
KIN, Hsin-Hui I. H. WHITED, Exporting Hyperinfl ation: The Long Arm of Chiang Kai-shek, in: 
China Economic Review, March 2005, Issue 1, Volume 16, Elsevier, Oxford 2005, pp. 71–89.
25)  For more information on American aid to Chiang’s regime in the period from Japanese 
surrender until 1948, see William Gleason LANGER, An Encyclopaedia of World History, 
Boston 1972, p. 1338.
26)  FAIRBANK, John King: Dějiny Číny, s. 374.
27)  Cf. Chiang’s opinions on the fall of his government in Lloyd E. EASTMAN Who Lost China? 
Chiang Kai-shek Testifi es, in: The China Quarterly, No. 88 (December 1981), Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 658–668.
ning of 1947, the government tried to stabilize the economy through “reform 
measures”, which were announced on February 16, 1947. They comprised 
a wage freeze at January 1947 levels, the setting of maximum prices of some 
basic commodities (rice, cotton, fuel, etc.) and a ban on the use of gold, silver 
and foreign currencies in trade between non-commercial entities. At the 
same time, the government took steps towards limiting the outfl ow of Chine-
se capital to Hong Kong. The eff ect of these measures was minimal as the set 
maximum prices were in reality adhered to only sporadically, mostly in lar-
ge cities. The reform had an impact only on the Shanghai-Nanking area, 
while in the country it had essentially no eff ect. Prices on the black market, 
which was expanding, grew rapidly. In approximately May 1947, the entire 
experiment collapsed.
The second attempt to halt the extraordinarily unfavourable eco-
nomic development and to save the situation occurred on August 19, 1948, 
with the introduction of the Gold Yuan.22 However, this emergency reform 
programme was merely the last gesture of desperate men who were stuck in 
economic chaos which they themselves had caused.23 It was obvious from the 
very beginning that this measure did not have much prospect for success. 
The “reform” was based on the forced exchange of gold, silver and foreign 
currencies (approximately USD 170 million in total) for the new currency. 
Pressure for this exchange was again strongest in the Shanghai-Nanking 
area, though the situation was particularly diffi  cult in Shanghai, where the-
re were long-term ties between the Guomindang and local fi nancial and 
business circles. Chiang’s son Jiang Jingguo was involved in exerting infl u-
ence upon them. In connection with this, around 3000 businessmen and 
entrepreneurs were arrested for resisting the measure. Forced exchange also 
led to a fatal impoverishment of the Chinese middle class as the new 
currency’s value started to fall sharply. What followed was the total fi nancial 
22)  The exchange rate of the new gold yuan to the existing currency was 1:3,000,000. The va-
lue of the American dollar was four new gold yuans. John King FAIRBANK, Dějiny Číny 
[A History of China], Prague 1998, p. 375.
23)  Suzanne PEPPER, The KMT – CCP Confl ict, 1945–1949, in: The Nationalist Era in China 
1927–1949, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991, p. 312.
